Reeling in Big Phish with a Deep MD5 Net by Wardman, Brad et al.
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 5 Number 3 Article 2 
2010 
Reeling in Big Phish with a Deep MD5 Net 
Brad Wardman 
University of Alabama, Birmingham 
Gary Warner 
University of Alabama, Birmingham 
Heather McCalley 
University of Alabama, Birmingham 
Sarah Turner 
University of Alabama, Birmingham 
Anthony Skjellum 
University of Alabama, Birmingham 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wardman, Brad; Warner, Gary; McCalley, Heather; Turner, Sarah; and Skjellum, Anthony (2010) "Reeling in 
Big Phish with a Deep MD5 Net," Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 5 : No. 3 , Article 2. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2010.1079 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol5/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
(c)ADFSL 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 5(3) 
 
33 
 
Reeling in Big Phish with a Deep MD5 Net  
Brad Wardman1, Gary Warner1,2, Heather McCalley1,  
Sarah Turner2, and Anthony Skjellum1  
University of Alabama at Birmingham 
Affiliations: Computer and Information Sciences1 and 
Justice Sciences2 
UBOB 402 
1530 3rd Ave South 
Birmingham, AL 35294-4562 
(205) 934-8620 
{bwardman, gar, saturner, hcarol, skjellum} @ uab.edu  
 
ABSTRACT 
Phishing continues to grow as phishers discover new exploits and attack vectors 
for hosting malicious content; the traditional response using takedowns and 
blacklists does not appear to impede phishers significantly.  A handful of law 
enforcement projects — for example the FBI's Digital PhishNet and the Internet 
Crime and Complaint Center (ic3.gov) — have demonstrated that they can collect 
phishing data in substantial volumes, but these collections have not yet resulted in 
a significant decline in criminal phishing activity. 
In this paper, a new system is demonstrated for prioritizing investigative resources 
to help reduce the time and effort expended examining this particular form of 
online criminal activity. This research presents a means to correlate phishing 
websites by showing that certain websites are created by the same phishing kit.  
Such kits contain the content files needed to create the counterfeit website and 
often contain additional clues to the identity of the creators.  A clustering 
algorithm is presented that uses collected phishing kits to establish clusters of 
related phishing websites. The ability to correlate websites provides law 
enforcement or other potential stakeholders with a means for prioritizing the 
allocation of limited investigative resources by identifying frequently repeating 
phishing offenders.  
Keywords: Phishing, Clustering, Data Mining, Cybercrime Provenance, Phishing 
Kits 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Phishing is a form of cybercrime in which a criminal, generally labeled as a 
phisher,  creates a fraudulent website or websites in order to lure victims into 
providing sensitive information such as usernames and passwords, social security 
numbers, and/or other information that can lead to identity theft, theft of online 
resources, or direct theft of assets.  The collected information is often used to 
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withdraw money fraudulently from bank accounts (Li & Schmitz 2009) and may 
even be sold to other criminals through chat rooms (Jakobsson & Myers 2006).  
Phishers send spam1 emails that mimic organizations by presenting  recipients 
with a supposed account problem and a website address, known as a URL 
(Uniform Resource Locator), where the user can fix the alleged problem (Ludl et 
al. 2007).  That URL leads to the phishing website where the victim is required to 
enter information to solve the made-up problem, thereby exposing his or her 
credentials to the cyber criminal.  Typically, these counterfeit websites are hosted 
on web servers compromised through an exploit of software application 
vulnerabilities or by the use of a stolen userid and password that a webmaster 
would use to update the website via file transfer protocol (FTP)  (Wardman et al. 
2009).   
Phishing attacks are gaining prevalence as more and more people use e-commerce 
and Internet banking websites, as discussed by Gartner research, documented 
evidence shows that more than five million U.S. citizens were phished from 
September 2007 to September 2008, representing a nearly a 40% increase from 
the previous year (Litan 2009).   
The phished organizations generally take three courses of action in response.  The 
organizations can simply ignore the phishing activity and reimburse financial 
losses suffered by their customers as a cost of doing business; they can optionally 
respond defensively by working to prevent users from visiting such malicious 
websites, or they can alternatively gather intelligence to help investigate, identify, 
and potentially prosecute the criminals behind the attacks.  A review of the on-
going practice across industry indicates that the defensive approach is the primary 
solution implemented by most organizations (Moore & Clayton 2007). 
One defensive approach that organizations adopt, known as “takedown,” is to 
identify phishing URLs and then contact the administrators of such websites in 
order to have the malicious content removed.  This organizational response has 
proven to make a difference, yet this method does not thwart the phishers from 
future attacks because the corrective action is limited to the elimination of the 
website (Moore & Clayton 2007).   
Blacklists are another defense mechanism for limiting the effectiveness of live 
phishing websites.  A blacklist is a list of website addresses confirmed to be 
hosting malicious content, ideally through a reliable means that limits the number 
of websites placed on the blacklist improperly.  Such a list can be used to prevent 
access to URLs in the potential victim’s browser (Soldo et al. 2008).  Blacklists 
are regularly improving with the increased reporting of live phishing websites to 
                                                 
1 Spamming is the practice of sending unsolicited bulk email messages, often for marketing or 
criminal purposes.  In the United States, the CANSPAM Act differentiates between legal and 
criminal bulk email on points such as whether the sender information is truthful, whether there 
is a means to “opt out” of future messages, and whether a true mailing address for the sender is 
provided. 
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anti-phishing vendor databases.  Nevertheless, spam campaigns2 for newly 
created phishing websites have been shown to last on average four - six hours; 
therefore, by the time it takes to blacklist and eventually disable a phishing 
website, the criminal has likely already moved on to spamming new URLs for the 
next phishing website (Sheng et al. 2009). 
The criminal justice perspective of rational choice theory (Lanier & Henry 2004) 
indicates that in order to dissuade phishers from future attacks, law enforcement 
would need to demonstrate that phishing behavior has negative consequences that 
exceed its rewards.  However, because of the complexity and breadth of 
knowledge required to handle phishing cases, corporate and law enforcement 
phishing investigators usually require numerous person-hours gathering evidence, 
analyzing data, and attempting to link smaller cases to a phisher. Law 
enforcement efforts can be supported through the efforts of organizations such as 
the Digital Phishnet (DPN), the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), and the 
Internet Crime and Complaint Center (IC3); organizations that provide law 
enforcement with evidence assembled through contributions from benevolent 
private sector entities (Anti-Phishing Working Group 2010; Digital Phishnet 
2010; Internet Crime and Complaint Center 2010). 
While the collections of phishing websites gathered by blacklist maintainers 
(McAfee 2010; Netcraft 2010) and recipients of consumer complaints are 
important, additional analysis can provide two factors critical to pursuing criminal 
prosecution of the phisher.  While blocking the URL may prevent further 
victimization, the URL does not identify the criminal.  However, files on the 
phishing web server usually contain the email address of the criminal to whom the 
stolen information is provided.  But, because phishing server content is often 
quickly replaced or deleted by webmasters to prevent further abuse, the file or 
files containing the criminal email address is often unavailable to investigators 
once they are able to access the system3.  If other sites can be shown to be related 
to the now-terminated phishing website, the missing evidence of identity may be 
retrieved from a more recent website created by the same or similar phishing kit.  
This evidence may help investigators in the prosecution of the offender.  Law 
enforcement could then serve legal process against the email account provider to 
obtain a login history, revealing the criminal’s Internet Protocol (IP) address, 
which could be used to identify their geographic location and Internet Service 
Provider. 
Furthermore, these URL collections do not provide any correlation between a 
given phishing website and financial losses caused by that site.  While a bank may 
                                                 
2 A spam or phishing campaign refers to the sending of a short, high volume distribution of 
email messages for a common intent.  Such periods of intense transmission of email messages 
with common intent are denoted a campaign. 
3 An important goal is to train system administrators on how to preserve phishing and other 
hacking evidence. 
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realize it has lost a particular sum of money to phishing, it often cannot associate a 
given phishing website to a precise volume of financial loss because it does not 
know which website victimized their account holder.  However, by reviewing the 
email records of the criminal, names and account numbers of victims could be 
positively linked to the phishing websites where the victimization occurred. 
Given these issues and circumstances surrounding phishing, the goal of this 
research is to provide law enforcement and victim organizations with analyzed 
data that links evidence together in order to justify an investigation against a 
phishing campaign.  A novel approach is developed here to cluster4 phishing 
websites based on the MD5 hash5 of the main web page and the associated 
content files used to create the website, such as graphics files, JavaScript files, and 
cascading style sheet files.  In this research, phishing kits are collected, analyzed, 
and clustered against phishing websites stored in the University of Alabama at 
Birmingham’s Phishing Data Mine (Wardman 2010).  The UAB Phishing Data 
Mine includes phishing-related website content files, phishing website analysis 
algorithms, phishing kits, and over 75,000 phishing URLs that were either 
manually confirmed to be phishing sites through visual inspection or 
automatically confirmed by Deep MD5 Matching6 (Wardman & Warner 2008) of 
the associated content files. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses other 
work related to the reduction of phishing.  Section 3 introduces this research’s 
methodology for collecting and correlating phishing evidence.  Section 4 presents 
the results of the phishing kit analysis and clustering technique.  Section 5 
discusses the implications of the results for law enforcement investigations and 
phished institutions.  Section 6 presents the conclusion of this work while future 
work related to this technique is presented in Section 7.   
2. RELATED WORK 
The following section discusses email filtering, user education, toolbars, and 
phishing activity aggregation and their use against phishing. 
2.1 Email Filtering 
One of the most widely used defensive mechanisms against phishing is email 
filters (Abu-Nimeh et al. 2007; Basnet et al. 2008; Chandrasekaran 2007; Fette et 
                                                 
4 Clustering is a way of grouping phishing websites that have substantial similarity in one or 
more respects and are more like each other than other websites. Data mining algorithms are 
used to create clusters by evaluating similarities and differences; these are in turn denoted 
“clustering algorithms.” 
5 MD5 hash – a value calculated by a standard one-way cryptographic algorithm.  If two files 
have the same MD5 value they are mathematically provable to be identical to within a small 
probability (Valdes et al. 2003)  
6 Deep MD5 Matching refers to a previous algorithm which compares the MD5 values of many 
files from the same website with those of another website to determine if the two websites are 
similar. 
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al. 2006).  The main goal of email filtering is to prevent a phishing email from 
reaching its intended recipient.  Anti-phishing email filters use a variety of 
methods to recognize that an email is phishing-related, such as its frequency 
across a network or natural language cues within the email. For instance, 
Microsoft reports that it’s SenderID, embedded in all of its email products and 
services, stops more than 25 million deceptive messages daily (Microsoft Safety 
2010).  Microsoft uses an email authentication technology protocol that “validates 
the origin of e-mail messages by verifying the IP address of the sender against the 
alleged owner of the sending domain” (Microsoft Safety 2010).  Users of 
Mozilla’s Thunderbird 3 open source email client can add this protection with the 
Sender Verification Extension (Tauberer 2008), and built-in to Thunderbird is the 
ability to warn users if they click on a link that appears to be directing them 
somewhere other than what is indicated in the email (Mozilla Messenging 2010). 
Early text-based approaches that work against spam were not as effective against 
phishing as against spam in general (Saberi et al. 2007) since phishing emails are 
designed to mimic legitimate email and therefore usually include language and 
keywords similar to those in legitimate email messages.  Researchers who are 
trying to improve anti-phishing email filters have more recently looked at other 
key features of an email message.  Research in this area focuses on identification 
of a feature set for machine learning algorithms, usually classifier ensembles 
(Abu-Nimeh et al. 2007; Toolan & Carthy 2009; Yu et al. 2009).  L’Huillier et al. 
proposed research into adversarial data mining, classifying by using a game 
mechanism theory between an adversary and an intelligent and adaptive classifier. 
(L’Huillier et al. 2009).  Fette et al. determined whether a communication is 
deceptive about the sender’s identity by analyzing features of the email such as 
the age of the domain names in the links or non-matching URLs (i.e., differences 
between the web page link and the text describing the link) (Fette et al. 2007).  
The limitations of email filtering and browser-based anti-phishing tools have been 
documented by Zhang (2007).   
More recently, social engineering approaches to phishing and attacks on statistical 
spam filters have thwarted email filters (Stamm et al. 2006; Wittel et al. 2004) .  
In what is known as spear-phishing, email messages have become highly targeted 
and contain the recipient’s personal information harvested from web pages, such 
as greeting the recipient by name, or including their job title or company name in 
the body of the email.  
2.2 User Education 
As explained in research describing the content-based anti-phishing technique 
CANTINA (Zhang et al. 2007), even toolbars that employ heuristics and achieve 
more accurate results can fail in the end result if users do not understand “what 
the toolbar is trying to communicate”.  Therefore, researchers have developed 
training tools, including video games, browser-embedded context-aware 
warnings, and animated phishing tests designed to teach users how to recognize 
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phish.  These techniques have long-term benefits when combined with other 
methods, such as the way the Netcraft toolbar incorporates educational content or 
the AntiPhishing Working Group’s redirection page, which encourages 
webmasters whose sites are compromised to replace the phishing URL with a link 
to a phishing education page (APWG 2009).  Although there are methods for 
restricting users from completing online forms (Ronda et al. 2008), it is important 
to avoid visiting phishing pages as there is an increased crossover between 
phishing and the distribution of malicious software or malware. 
2.3 Browser-Based Filters 
Phishing victimization can be prevented by detecting and blocking access to 
identified phishing websites from within a web browser.  The Internet Explorer, 
Firefox, Google Chrome, and Safari browsers (Microsoft Safety 2010; Whittaker 
et al.) and many turn-key security products now offer anti-phishing capabilities 
(McAfee 2010; Netcraft Anti-Phishing Toolbar 2010; Symantec 2010). These 
operate with the use of blacklists, whitelists7, and heuristics.  However, many 
current blacklists fail to identify phishing URLs in the early hours of a phishing 
attack because they cannot be updated quickly enough (Ludl et al. 2007).  This is 
important because the majority of phishing campaigns have been shown to last 
less than two hours (Sheng et al. 2009).  Therefore, when a phishing website is 
positively identified and blacklisted within a browser, the campaign has usually 
already ended.   Nonetheless, blacklists can have an effect that lasts longer than 
just the length of the campaign itself. 
In addition to slow updating, another drawback of blacklists is specific to 
phishing.  As many as 78% of phishing websites are hosted on hacked domains 
(Aaron  & Rasmussen 2010), a statistic which indicates that legitimate websites 
may be left on blacklists long after the offensive content has been removed, 
potentially causing reputational harm to the legitimate website or organization.  
Blacklists are important in reducing the overall losses to phishing but are more 
effective when enhanced with other browser-based components such as heuristics 
(Sheng et al. 2009).  
Whitelists are lists of websites that should never be blocked because they are 
determined to pertain to legitimate purposes and/or belong to legitimate 
organizations.  These lists can be helpful when combined with other measures, 
especially in tightly monitored enterprise environments where it is possible to 
limit internet usage to a small set of websites relevant to business function.  They 
are also employed at the user level, but this strategy often requires a training 
period that would frustrate most individuals as the browser asks, “Should this 
webpage be whitelisted?” for each unclassified webpage they visit (Cao et al. 
2008). 
                                                 
7 While blacklists are lists of known-to-be dangerous or criminal websites, whitelists are lists of 
known-to-be legitimate sites.   
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Heuristics can be used in combination with blacklists such as (Netcraft Anti-
Phishing Toolbar) in browser-based anti-phishing, but automated techniques can 
lead to high false-positive rates compared to manually updated techniques as 
automated techniques can falsely identify legitimate websites as phish (Ronda et 
al. 2008).  Techniques to reduce false positives include manual verification before 
blacklisting a website, whitelisting, and the use of other techniques such as 
Google’s PageRank (Whittaker 2010; Zhang et al. 2007).  PhishNet uses a 
method to enhance existing blacklists by discovering related malicious URLs 
using known phishing tactics such as changing up the top-level domain only 
(Prakash et al. 2010).   
Google has outlined its blacklist updating process, which uses a scalable machine 
learning classifier trained on a large, noisy dataset (Whittaker et al. 2010).  
Features used by the Google blacklist include information extracted about the 
URL including whether it is on a whitelist, whether the URL uses an IP address as 
the domain name, and how many hostname components (words separated by a 
“.”) there are before the domain name.  The Google process also fetches the page 
content and extracts features about the host computer and the extent to which 
pages link to other domains. Combining these features with several others, 
Google’s classifier “learns a robust model for” the millions of pages it crawls 
(Whittaker et al. 2010).  This classifier eliminates false positives by evaluating 
their proprietary PageRank since, as the researchers conclude, there are no 
phishing pages with high PageRank.   
2.4 Phishing Activity Aggregation 
Most methods described above are defensive in nature, but some researchers have 
focused on the aggregation of information about phishing incidents (Basnet et al. 
2008; Irani et al. 2008; Weaver & Collins 2007).  Clustering algorithms based on 
the content of the email messages is found to be ineffective because of the short 
life of the features that can be extracted from the headers and the duplication that 
is found in the intended mimicry of the content (Basnet et al. 2008; Irani et al. 
2008).  Another form of phishing information aggregation is an algorithm that 
clusters reported phishing scams if they are hosted on the same IP address or 
network8 in order to estimate the extent of phishing on those networks (Weaver & 
Collins 2007).  This approach implies that the phishing websites hosted on the 
same networks are from the same phisher.   
3. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology in this work is an information-gathering and analysis 
process that proactively provides intelligence to phishing investigators or other 
stakeholders about the phishers who are the most prolific during a certain interval 
                                                 
8  A network is a collection of IP addresses managed under the same organization.  When groups 
of IP addresses within a network have regularly hosted malicious content, other IP addresses 
on that network will be considered higher risk by IP reputation systems.     
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of time.  Figure 1 illustrates the overall process used here. The first step in the 
process is to receive potential phishing URLs from various sources and 
incorporate them into the UAB Phishing Data Mine.  A preprocessing step 
removes duplicate URLs and those that are already present in the UAB Phishing 
Data Mine.  Duplicate URLs are those that contain the same domain name, path, 
and filename, ignoring varied parameter values that may follow the filename after 
a question mark or ampersand appears.  The next step is to attempt to 
automatically confirm the URLs.  If a URL is automatically confirmed as a phish 
through Deep MD5 Matching, then the URL is sent to the automated kit search 
tool; however, when the URL is not automatically confirmed, it is queued for 
manual confirmation.   
 
Figure 1. The overall framework for phishing URL confirmation and the 
phishing kit collection, extraction, and correlation process 
 
When URLs are manually confirmed (e.g., by trained personnel) there are two 
avenues for collecting phishing kits.  For specific UAB-partnered target brands, 
the person who labeled the URL as a phish traverses the directory tree structure of 
the URL9, searching for readable directories that may contain phishing kits.  
Secondly, all manually confirmed URLs are also sent to the automated kit search 
tool.  Both kit searching methodologies currently require the subsequent manual 
extraction of phishing kit information.  The unique identifier of the URLs where 
kits were found is finally sent to a clustering algorithm which groups closely-
related phishing websites based on the website content files. 
                                                 
9 “Traversing the directory tree” involves checking each directory included in the path portion of 
the URL to determine if it may reveal a list of files on the web server in that directory.  A 
secure web server does not allow these file lists to be displayed, but most phishing sites are 
hosted on web servers with low security; so, open directories are often able to be located. 
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3.1 Kit Collection 
The goal of the UAB phishing operations team is to confirm phishing URLs 
promptly either through automated techniques or manual inspection.  Shorter 
latencies for detecting and confirming phishing URLs lead to a higher likelihood 
of researchers being able to collect relevant evidence against phishers, while 
websites remain up and running. This prompt confirmation is needed because, 
once notified, system administrators of hacked websites delete evidence that 
could identify the phisher.  Examples of evidence that are often deleted include 
phishing kits, the phisher’s email addresses, and other potential clues as to who 
created the phishing website.    
Phishing websites typically collect data from the victim in an HTML form.  Each 
form has an “action” that calls a program telling the website what to do with the 
stolen information.  Usually the action calls a program on the web server that 
sends an email message to the criminal.  These destination email addresses are 
called “drop addresses.”  Occasionally, the action statement will contain the drop 
address, but usually it is hidden in the program, which can be found in the 
phishing kit.  Inside a phishing kit, the drop addresses may be found in cleartext 
or encoded with techniques such as ASCII-to-hex and/or Base64 encoding, 
making the drop address less obvious to a human investigator (Cova et al. 2008). 
The UAB phishing operations team analyzed and documented 470 phishing kits 
between November 2008 and March 2010.  The phishing kit retrieval process has 
evolved since the team began analyzing kits as some important lessons were 
acquired through the collection process.  First, evidence needs to be saved, not 
just documented.  Early in the process, the existence of a phishing kit was 
documented, but the kit itself was not preserved. Secondly, the URL that the kit 
was acquired from does not always correlate to the URL distributed through 
email, as many URLs contain a command that automatically redirects the victim 
to an additional website where the phishing content would likely be found.  
Because of such potential redirection, some of the kits discovered through a 
manual directory traversal are not located on the same server as the URL that was 
sent as the email link.  An automated approach was developed in order to resolve 
these issues. 
Algorithms and prototype software were devised to search for phishing kits in 
domains of phishing websites when phishing URLs are confirmed10.  The tool 
produced from this effort searches for commonly used phishing filenames (i.e., 
paypal.zip, eBay.zip, or chase.zip) by traversing the directory structure of the 
phishing URL.  In this study, the tool was used to search for 130 common 
phishing kit names and to download the kit using GNU Wget 1.11.4 Red Hat 
modified.  After download, the phishing kits are manually analyzed, and 
                                                 
10 “Confirming a URL as a phish” means to verify that a website is a phishing website and not 
benign (at least with regard to phishing). 
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evidence, such as the email addresses and aliases of phishing kit creators and 
editors, is extracted and stored for use in future investigations.   
3.2 Deep MD5 Matching 
Comparing the MD5 hash of the web page advertised to the victim, hereafter 
referred to as the main index page, with those of confirmed phishing websites is a 
method for automatically verifying phishing websites (Provos 2009).  When the 
MD5 values of the main index pages match, the potential phishing URL can be 
confirmed to be a phish and labeled with the brand that the website is imitating.  
This technique is often used by organizations and takedown companies to 
automatically confirm phish.  However, this technique has significant limitations 
as discussed in (Wardman & Warner 2008).  Simplistic obfuscation can defeat 
this technique by causing MD5s of the main index pages to be different while still 
using all the same files from a kit.  Examples of obfuscation methodologies are 
the use of website scripts to include the recipients’ email address passed from the 
URL or to include the current timestamp in the main index file each time the 
website is visited.  Given the examples below, including this dynamic information 
causes the MD5 of the main webpage to vary even though the content is identical. 
In the below case, the recipients’ email addresses are passed through the 
parameter ‘login_email.’ 
http://www.paypal.com.ufiyr4gscz.125tcb5cbquts9howt09.com/cgi-bin/webscr/?login-
dispatch&login_email=victim1@mailaddress.com&ref=pp&login-processing=ok 
http://www.paypal.com.e20jqm91gysjhz7yt.125ci3qk5uipl4wo3hr3.com/cgi-
bin/webscr/?login-dispatch&login_email=victim2@domain.com&ref=pp&login-
processing=ok 
http://www.paypal.com.0o4589zq8stnemcjy.125kpszbkwapqkvzhkp3.com/cgi-
bin/webscr/?login-dispatch&login_email=victim3@mailserver.net&ref=pp&login-
processing=ok 
Deep MD5 Matching is a patent-pending technique for overcoming obfuscation 
by determining the similarity between two sets of associated files downloaded 
from potential and known phishing websites.  Deep MD5 Matching uses Wget to 
download the content files associated with a potential phishing website.  Content 
files are typically images, scripts, and style sheets such as gif, jpg, js, php, and css 
files.  The set of content files from the potential phishing website is compared to 
sets of files of previously confirmed phishing websites using the value of their 
Kulczynski 2 coefficient (Kulczynski 1927).  The Kulczynski 2 coefficient is 
expressed in Equation 1 where a is the number of matching file MD5s between 
the sets 1 and 2, b is the number of elements in set 1 that do not have MD5s 
matching a file in set 2, and c is the number of elements in set 2 that do not have 
MD5s matching a file in set 1. 
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The value provided be evaluating Equation 1 measures the similarity between two 
file sets by taking the average of the proportion of matching files in the two file 
sets.  The Kulczynski 2 similarity coefficient was selected because the percentage 
of matching files in one file set should have equal weight to the percentage of 
matching files in the other file set, so as not to discriminate against the file set of 
either URL.   Other matching criteria are also possible. 
 
 
Figure 2.  index.php (left), index.html (right) 
 
Figure 2 helps to illustrate how Deep MD5 Matching operates.  The two nearly 
identical PayPal phishing websites depicted in Figure 2 were hosted on two 
different domains.  The web page depicted on the left is a confirmed phishing 
website, while the web page on the right represents a potential phishing website.  
The main index page on the left is named index.php and has six associated 
content files that comprise the web page’s appearance and functionality.  The 
main index page on the right is named index.html and also has six content files.  
Both websites contain the same total number of files and have identical, 
associated content files as verified through their MD5 values. The only difference 
between the two file sets are the MD5s of the main index pages.  Equation 2 
illustrates how the Kulczynski 2 coefficient is applied to the two PayPal websites.   
  
 
Eq. 1 
Eq. 2 
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The result of Equation 2 produces a similarity score greater than our threshold 
(which is chosen at .85 currently); therefore, Deep MD5 Matching identifies and 
brands the potential phishing URL as a PayPal phishing website. 
3.3 Clustering 
This study employs manual and automatic kit collection and Deep MD5 Matching 
for gathering and correlating evidence for law enforcement.  The collection 
process consists of identification, download, and analysis of the phishing kits, 
while the correlation process uses an agglomerative11 clustering algorithm based 
on Deep MD5 Matching.  In order to improve computational speed, the clustering 
algorithm is performed in four phases as depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  The four phases and results of the clustering process. 
 
The Deep MD5 clustering algorithm proceeds as follows.  Phases 1 and 2 initially 
merge clusters only within the set of URLs of collected kits.  Each URL that 
results in the discovery and acquisition of a phishing kit represents an initial 
cluster of size one.  As clusters merge and items are subsequently added to 
clusters, there remains only one representative URL for each cluster.  All future 
items compared to the cluster only use the representative URL to indicate 
similarity.  In Phase 1, clusters merge if the MD5 of the main index pages are 
equal.  Phase 2 merges clusters whose representative URLs have content files 
with a Kulczynski 2 similarity coefficient greater than or equal to 0.85.  The 
average number of files per phishing website that contained at least two files was 
computed over a three month data set of collected phishing websites.  The 
resulting average number of files retrieved per website was 8.73.  If the main 
index page of a website under consideration matches exactly, it would be 
clustered under Phase 1 or 3.  Therefore, Deep MD5 matching (Phases 2 and 4) 
assumes at least one file has a non-matching MD5.  The calculation of 7.73 files 
of 8.73 would give a similarity of 0.89.  (While the threshold 0.85 was chosen for 
this experiment future work will test the false positives and false negatives 
generated by other threshold values, with particular attention to exploring lower 
threshold values to ensure reduction in false negatives, but with the concomitant 
risk of added false positives.) 
                                                 
11 Agglomerative clustering is an algorithm that places individual elements into their own 
clusters and merges these clusters based on particular conditions such as similarity coefficients 
or distance metrics (Han & Kambler 2001). 
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Phases 3 and 4 enhance the clusters created in phases 1 and 2 by measuring the 
similarity between those clusters and all other URLs in the UAB Phishing Data 
Mine.  Phase 3 compares the MD5 of the main index page for each representative 
URL against the MD5s of the main index page all unclustered URLs.  If the 
MD5s match, the URL is added to the cluster.  In Phase 4 those URLs that are not 
yet clustered are considered in the same manner as Phase 2, and joined to a cluster 
if the threshold is exceeded. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section describes the results of the manual and automatic phishing kit 
collection and phishing website clustering algorithm.   
4.1 Phishing Kits 
In this study a total of 460 phishing kits were collected through a combination of 
both the manual and automated tree traversal methodologies discussed in Section 
3.1.  The manual approach collected 323 phishing kits between November 2008 
and March 2010 that were associated with phishing URLs in the UAB Phishing 
Data Mine.  The automated technique used in this study had a duration of two 
weeks in September 2009 during which 137 valid phishing kits were retrieved.  
 
The manual analysis of the 137 phishing kits retrieved automatically discovered 
181 unique email addresses and 81 unique aliases of kit creators or the criminals 
who customized a particular kit in order to include their own email address.  The 
manual processing of the kits includes following the action parameter from the 
main phishing page to the filenames in the kit.  A kit will normally contain at least 
one drop email address, usually in cleartext12, but the kit often contains other 
information that may help to identify its author or distributor, such as an alias, a 
comment, or other artifact.  As mentioned above, kit authors sometimes create a 
covert channel to receive stolen information by encoding their drop email 
addresses in their kit so that unaware phishers will do the work of creating the 
websites while the kit author still receives the victim information via the secret 
drop addresses embedded in the kit. 
4.2 Clustering of Phishing Websites 
A clustering algorithm was created to identify phishing websites that may prove 
to be of interest for further investigation and link them to the aliases and email 
addresses found in the above methodology.  The combination of the manual and 
automated phishing kit collection methodologies gathered 460 phishing kits.  
These 460 phishing kits yielded 458 unique URLs as two of the URLs had a kit 
retrieved both manually and automatically.  The clustering algorithm consists of 
four phases as illustrated in Figure 3.   
                                                 
12 Text with no obfuscation or encryption applied to it. 
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The first two phases of the presented clustering algorithm merge clusters 
consisting of 458 phishing websites.  The latter two phases add additional 
phishing sites to these clusters by comparing them to other phishing sites found in 
the UAB Phishing Data Mine that did not have phishing kits associated. The 
results of performing Phase 1, which merges the initial clusters by main index file 
MD5 matching, only merged two clusters.  Therefore, 457 clusters were the input 
to Phase 2, which merges clusters based on Deep MD5 Matching.  After Phase 2, 
106 clusters were merged, leaving 351 clusters.  The largest cluster after Phase 1 
consisted of two phishing sites, while the largest cluster after Phase 2 contained 
24 phishing sites. 
Phases 3 and 4 perform a similar function as Phases 1 and 2, respectively, except 
Phases 3 and 4 increase the size of existing clusters instead of merging clusters.  
Using the existing 351 clusters, Phase 3 added 85 phishing sites from the UAB 
Phishing Data Mine to the clusters, while Phase 4 added 7,030 phishing sites.  
The largest cluster in Phase 3 contained 67 phishing sites, and the largest cluster 
in Phase 4 contained 865. 
The final results after all four phases of clustering left 351 clusters containing a 
total of 7,573 phishing sites.  During the manual labeling method practiced by the 
UAB phishing operations team, websites that are not displaying phishing content 
at the time of manual review are marked as “unknown” or “not a phish.”  
However, the automated process downloads website content when the URL is 
first reported, and through the matching of content files, the clustering algorithm 
was able to establish that 1,467 websites that had been labeled as being either an 
unknown or as not a phish could now be identified as phish.  Twenty-four phished 
institutions were represented by these clusters.  Approximately 18% of the sites in 
the clusters had files that were exactly the same, as measured by a similarity 
coefficient of 1.0.  Therefore, sites were merged or added to clusters 82% of the 
time because of Deep MD5 clustering where the similarity measure is greater than 
or equal to 0.85.  This means that if the clustering algorithm were limited to 
matching only the index pages or exact matches of all content files, then 6,245 
phishing sites would not have been included in clusters and would therefore be 
considered singleton instances of a phishing attack.   
Approximately 34% of the clusters contained at least one other phishing site in 
the cluster, while the other 64% were singletons.  There were 57 clusters that 
contained ten or more phishing sites, and the 24 largest clusters each contained 
more than 100 phishing websites.  Table 1 shows the cluster sizes for the top ten 
clusters in this study.   
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Rank Cluster Size Brands 
1 865 Bank A 
2 591 Bank B 
3 549 Bank A 
4 445 Bank A 
5 433 Bank A 
6 357 Bank C 
7 332 Bank D 
8 228 Bank D 
9 203 Bank C 
10 181 Bank A 
 
Table 1.  The top 10 cluster sizes with associated brands 
 
The results contained 190 clusters where the seed website contained only one file, 
the main index page.  Of these 190 clusters, only 25 had more than one website 
within the cluster, demonstrating that dynamic content often bypasses main index 
matching.  The largest of these one file clusters consisted of 135 websites and is 
the 19th largest cluster.  Finally, phishing kits whose MD5 values matched had 
URLs found in the same clusters, an indication that the hypothesis, that websites 
created by the same phishing kit will cluster, holds. 
5. DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the results of the Deep MD5 clustering algorithm.  First, 
the results of the clustering phases are described.  Next, a representative cluster is 
described in detail.  Lastly, the relevance of the technique to law enforcement and 
phished organizations is discussed. 
5.1 Clustering Phase Analysis 
The results of the clustering phases demonstrated the ability for Deep MD5 
clustering to enhance the grouping of similar websites when compared to main 
index page matching.  In both the merging and adding phases described in Section 
4.2, Deep MD5 clustering was able to merge and add clusters at a much greater 
rate than compared to main index clustering.  Although this experiment started 
with only 458 phishing websites, the final results established relationships among 
7,573 websites.  Furthermore, the algorithm showed the ability to confirm 
phishing websites that were previously labeled as unknown or not a phish by 
manual review.  
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Phase 1 – Main index 
clustering 
2 seconds 
Phase 2 – Deep MD5 
clustering 
3 minutes 11 seconds 
Phase 3 – Main index 
clustering 
11 minutes 12 seconds 
Phase 4 – Deep MD5 
clustering 
8 hours 23 minutes 1 second 
 
Table 2. Run times of clustering phases 
 
As expected, main index clustering performed poorly because of the dynamic 
content in the main index page.  Table 2 demonstrates that main index matching 
has a considerably faster run time than Deep MD5 clustering.  On larger data sets, 
the difference between the two clustering algorithms’ run times will have a 
greater impact on total run time.  This suggests that main index clustering should 
be used to help reduce the number of websites to be clustered by other more time-
intensive techniques.  
  5.2 Cluster Analysis 
Although clusters can be viewed as collections of phishing URLs and their 
associated content files, each cluster has its own distinguishing characteristics 
such as the composition of the set of files and variations found in the distinct files 
used to create the clusters.  Different versions of phishing kits contain a number of 
similar files, but, over time, creators modify the kit design, dispersing them 
through a variety of distribution avenues, such as websites where they can be 
downloaded for “free”. Even though kits by the same creator typically have many 
similar files, the number of files in the kit will vary slightly, and only a handful of 
files will be distinct.  
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the composition of a cluster, the third 
largest cluster containing 549 members was evaluated.  This cluster was chosen 
for further description since it contained the largest collection of phishing kits 
found through clustered URLs.  In this particular cluster, there were 38 URLs that 
had an associated phishing kit downloaded from them.  This cluster has URLs 
with file counts ranging from 26 files to 46 files.  For 94% of the URLs, the files 
numbered in the range of 30 – 35.  There is apparently a strong relationship 
between the number of files downloaded from the URL and the number of files 
found in the associated kit. Each of the URLs in this cluster has at least an 85% 
similarity to the seed URL.  When slight changes in file counts are found in 
closely-related kits, they are considered by the authors’ approach to be related to 
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“versioning” of the kit.  For example, there might be a single new graphic added 
or a new set of questions requiring an additional JavaScript file, but generally the 
preponderance of the kit remains constant. 
Table 3 shows the number of downloaded files with the number of kit files across 
the 38 URLs where kits were obtained.    In most cases, there are 26 more files 
extracted from the kit than are downloaded from the URL.  The significant file 
difference is because of the limitations of the fetching technique used to download 
the URL files.  The phishing site is designed to present the victim with a series of 
forms to be completed.  Wget only obtains the files associated with the main 
index page as downloading the additional web pages would require user input.  
This does not impact the validity of the findings as trends are still evident in the 
results. 
Number of Kits Number of Files 
from URL 
Number of Files 
from the Kit 
3 30 56 
1 30 62 
1 32 60 
5 33 58 
23 33 59 
2 33 60 
1 33 61 
1 34 60 
1 34 61 
 
Table 3.  Illustrates the similarities and mutations of phishing kits 
 
Some phishing kits produce websites that present the victim with multiple pages 
for user-provided information, but the pages after the first are not processed 
unless realistic answers are provided at each step.  All of the content files not 
downloaded via Wget are part of these subsequent user-input pages.  Table 4 
contains a comparison of the types of files downloaded from the URLs of the 
analyzed cluster to the files extracted from the associated phishing kits.  These 
particular file lists are associated with the URLs that have 33 associated website 
files and 59 extracted kit files.   
Analysis of the mean number of kit files yielded additional drop email 
obfuscation methods. For example, one of the kits that contained 57 files was 
determined to have a fake image file that contained a hidden email address.  
Additionally, kits that were missing the file named check_fields.js instead used a 
hexadecimal-to-ASCII obfuscation in the main index page. 
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Files downloaded from URL Files extracted from kit 
1 – PHP file 1 – PHP file
8 – Cascading Style Sheets 4 – HTML files 
14 – GIF images 8 – Cascading Style Sheets 
10 – JavaScript files 24 – GIF images 
 21 – JavaScript files 
 1 – ASPX  
 
Table 4.  A comparison of files between the URL file set and the kit file set. 
 
Analyzing the files that have remained unchanged revealed that one of the two 
email addresses s33th3rs@yahoo.co.uk and seether@safe-mail.net was hidden 
with Base64 encoding in JavaScript files. This relation was found in 36 out of the 
38 kits, providing confidence that the other 511 URLs in the cluster have a 95% 
likelihood of being associated with the same drop email addresses.    
5.3 Law Enforcement Investigations 
This research indicates the effect that clustering of phishing website content files 
have on identifying malicious actors.  The website clusters help to present law 
enforcement and financial institutions as to which cybercriminals most likely 
warrant investigation based on the volume of websites these criminals are 
distributing and maintaining.  Because there are many competing priorities for 
investigative attention, the application of clustering techniques to phishing data 
will help to ensure that habitual offenders are investigated with a higher priority 
than first-time offenders who are likely to have claimed fewer victims at this point 
in time.  Reports generated using the techniques above are currently being shared 
with law enforcement.  Investigators within financial institutions are also using 
these reports to assist in their internal investigations and have expressed that this 
information greatly enhances their investigative capacity. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Phishing is an important cybercrime that needs to be hindered, and phishing 
criminals need to be identified as a prerequisite to pursuing them legally.  In 
response, phishing web site clustering is a new, effective methodology for 
identifying significant high-volume offenders in the area of phishing, as compared 
to others, with direct impact on the ability to prioritize investigations.  In 
particular, by clustering phishing URLs, evidence can be provided to law 
enforcement that distinguishes clusters of criminal activity indicating a potential 
high value target for investigation.  The largest URL clusters can be further 
investigated to identify associated kits that reveal the drop email addresses of the 
most significant suspects. These known phishing email addresses and aliases, 
identified in the kits and linked to the clusters, can serve as the starting points of a 
criminal investigation. Law enforcement can then use the process of subpoena 
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and search warrant to identify the IP address of the alleged criminal who checks 
that email and the identities of the victims who can now be tied to this particular 
criminal’s activities.  The URL clusters generated by this research provide two 
missing factors for law enforcement – clues to the identity of the phisher and a 
means to measure the phishing damages caused by this particular criminal. 
7. FUTURE WORK 
In the next phase of this research, the authors plan to work with a law 
enforcement partner agency to focus law enforcement attention on identified “top 
kits” and to measure the likelihood of successful identification, arrest, and 
prosecution compared to traditional methods.  To further automate this process, 
software will be developed to extract pertinent information such as email 
addresses and aliases from the phishing kits.  
A further analysis of the clustering algorithm developed here will be applied to 
over 75,000 phishing URLs in the UAB Phishing Data Mine and used to identify 
and document the key trends that have evolved over time.  Modifications to the 
clustering algorithm will allow for generation of clusters given a large random 
data set, rather than beginning with URLs corresponding to phishing kits.   
Adjustments to the thresholds used in this work and measurements of false 
positives and false negatives associated with varying this parameter will be 
studied, as will multiple approaches to match files and sets of files beyond use of 
MD5 hashes.  Additionally, filters will be applied to ensure that many common 
small files do not cause false positives, and sampling methods will be explored to 
reduce the total volume of files that must be downloaded from certain sites with 
huge numbers of files and aggregate file size. 
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